United Nations S/2002/756

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 10 July 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached report from Papua New Guinea, submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
Chairman
Counter-Terrorism Committee

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Annex

Note verbale dated 3 July 2002 from the Permanent Mission of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

The Permanent Mission of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations and has the honour to inform the latter through the attached aide mémoire (see enclosure) of the actions taken by the Government of Papua New Guinea in relation to United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) on counter-terrorism measures.

The Government of Papua New Guinea will continue to take other appropriate measures, including legislative changes to its laws and accession to other international conventions in due course, and will keep the Security Council informed of the same.

Enclosure

Aide mémoire No. 01/2002

United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) on counter-terrorism measures

In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the Government of Papua New Guinea as a responsible Member State of the United Nations has taken various measures to comply with the above resolution.

Last year, the Prime Minister Sir Makere Morauta and consequently the former Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations, H.E Ambassador Peter Donigi made statements expressing support for the fight against international terrorism. However, Papua New Guinea is yet to adopt a comprehensive policy against international terrorism which would include appropriate changes to its legislation to deal with terrorism.

Of the List of 12 most significant (UN) International Conventions and Protocols, Papua New Guinea has signed and ratified three of these Conventions, which relate to terrorism, namely:

1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention" 1963- Safety of Aviation.

2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention," 1970- aircraft hijackings).

3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation ("Montreal Convention," 1971- applies to acts of aviation sabotage such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight).

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has also submitted documents to the Department of Foreign Affairs to prepare Instruments of Ratification for another three ratifications, namely: -

(a) *" Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection - 1991"*

(b) *"the Protocol relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Article 50 a), signed at Montreal on 26 October, 1990"*

(c) *"the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,(Extends and Supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety), 1988."*

The ratifications have been forwarded to the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, Canada.

In addition, the Department of Foreign Affairs has forwarded a submission concerning the remaining six (6) Conventions to the Department of the Attorney General for their clearance. After clearance by the Attorney General's Department, the submission will then be put to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to seek the National Executive Council's (NEC) endorsement, approval and subsequent direction for the Foreign Minister to sign the Instruments of Accession to these Conventions and protocols.

The above submission also seek the NEC's approval for PNG to ratify these conventions and protocols in accordance with Section 117 (3) of the Papua New Guinea Constitution.

Individual Agencies such as Civil Aviation have also taken steps to address other areas of security concerns. For example, the Office of the Civil Aviation has established a Committee, which also comprises line Agencies to discuss and coordinate measures to counter possible hijacking of aircraft.

Papua New Guinea is a signatory to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and therefore is obligated to discharge aviation security in accordance with Annex 17. This Annex defines security as *"a combination of measures and human and material resources intended to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference."*

Under this Annex, the Papua New Guinea Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has

- Established measures to prevent weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices from being introduced on board an aircraft;

- Established measures to ensure that checked baggage is subjected to screening before being placed on board an aircraft; and requires operators providing service to implement a security program appropriate to meet the requirements of the national civil aviation security program;

- Established an airport security program, adequate to the needs of international traffic, for airports serving international civil aviation and is constantly reviewing the level of threat within its territory taking into account the international situation and adjustments in the relevant elements of the aviation security program accordingly.

Apart from the above actions, the Civil Aviation Authority is constantly reviewing the level of threat posed within the territory and is mindful of the events taking place in other parts of the world and will take all the necessary precaution to counter terrorism.

With regard to the financial measures, the Bank of Papua New Guinea has not taken additional measures as a result of the attacks of 11 September , 2001. The Bank however will use the provisions of the Bank and Financial Institutions Act 2000 and all existing criminal laws of the country to prosecute offenders as the Bank does view acts of

terrorism as criminal offences and all parties involved (including financiers) will be prosecuted under the criminal law.

Offences and penalties vary as to offences according to the criminal law and may range from certain term in prison to life imprisonment for individuals and directors of companies.

Section 4 (c) of the Banks and Financial Institutions Act 2000 (BFIA) empowers the regulator (Bank of PNG) to suppress or aid in suppressing illegal, dishonorable or improper practices of authorized institutions (licensed under BFIA). This includes directing banks and financial institutions to freeze accounts and assets of clients believed to be conducting illegal business.

The Bank of Papua New Guinea directed commercial banks in early 2000 to close existing bank accounts or refuse to open bank accounts for any money scheme operators.

In terms of the measures currently in existence to prohibit the activities of terrorists, the banks and financial institutions are required to conduct banking business in a prudent manner. It is common practice among commercial banks to gather sufficient identification of potential clients before opening accounts. This comes in the form of identification by existing clients, letter of identification from employers, drivers license and passports for individuals, and evidence of registration with the Investment Promotion Authority. The banks are further required to take appropriate action against existing clients doing illegal business.

This is further strengthened by Section 29 of the Bank and Financial Institutions Act (2000), which empowers the Bank of Papua New Guinea to obtain information and require the production of documents by authorized institutions and under Section 35 (duty to give information).

In addition, the Government has also taken particular note of the three (3) new UN Protocols on Transnational Organized Crime.

More recently, the Director General of the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) also submitted a report on the outcome of the Honolulu Workshop on Counter-Terrorism, including appropriate recommendations for its consideration and attention.

I trust this Report assists in your deliberations to this point. This Mission is liaising with the Government for continuous updates so that we can in turn inform you and the Committee of the progress.

Robert G. Aisi
Ambassador/Permanent Representative.

United Nations S/2002/757

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2002

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, including resolutions 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995, 1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995, 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996, 1144 (1997) of 19 December 1997, 1168 (1998) of 21 May 1998, 1174 (1998) of 15 June 1998, 1184 (1998) of 16 July 1998, 1247 (1999) of 18 June 1999, 1305 (2000) of 21 June 2000, 1357 (2001) of 21 June 2001, and 1396 (2002) of 5 March 2002,

Reaffirming its commitment to the political settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States there within their internationally recognized borders,

Welcoming the arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 27 May 2002 of the new High Representative, looking forward to working closely with him, and emphasizing its full support for the High Representative's continued role,

Underlining its commitment to support the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace Agreement, S/1995/999, annex), as well as the relevant decisions of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC),

Emphasizing its appreciation to the High Representative, the Commander and personnel of the multinational stabilization force (SFOR), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the personnel of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), including the Commissioner and personnel of the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the personnel of other international organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for their contributions to the implementation of the Peace Agreement,

Welcoming the decision by the Council of Europe inviting Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a member and *expressing* its understanding that Bosnia and Herzegovina will commit itself to make progress towards fully meeting the standards of a modern democracy as a multi-ethnic, multicultural and united society,

Welcoming recent progress in effecting the decision of the Constitutional Court and calling upon all to support swift implementation of constitutional amendments in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is critical to the establishment of

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stable democratic and multi-ethnic political and administrative institutions necessary for the implementation of the Peace Agreement,

Welcoming the positive steps of the Governments of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia towards fulfilling their continuing obligations as signatories of the Peace Agreement, strengthening their bilateral relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and their increasing cooperation with all relevant international organizations in implementing the Peace Agreement,

Emphasizing that a comprehensive and coordinated return of refugees and displaced persons throughout the region continues to be crucial to lasting peace,

Recalling the declarations of the Ministerial meetings of the Peace Implementation Conference,

Noting the reports of the High Representative, including his latest report of 13 May 2002 (S/2002/547),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 5 June 2002 (S/2002/618) and *welcoming* the UNMIBH Mandate Implementation Plan,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994 and the statement of its President of 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/4),

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

I

1. *Reaffirms* once again its support for the Peace Agreement, as well as for the Dayton Agreement on implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995 (S/1995/1021, annex), *calls upon* the parties to comply strictly with their obligations under those Agreements, and *expresses* its intention to keep the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under review;

2. *Reiterates* that the primary responsibility for the further successful implementation of the Peace Agreement lies with the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves and that the continued willingness of the international community and major donors to assume the political, military and economic burden of implementation and reconstruction efforts will be determined by the compliance and active participation by all the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in implementing the Peace Agreement and rebuilding a civil society, in particular in full cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in strengthening joint institutions, which foster the building of a fully functioning self-

sustaining state, able to integrate itself into the European structures and in facilitating returns of refugees and displaced persons;

3. *Reminds* the parties once again that, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, they have committed themselves to cooperate fully with all entities involved in the implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as it carries out its responsibilities for dispensing justice impartially, and *underlines* that full cooperation by States and entities with the International Tribunal includes, inter alia, the surrender for trial of all persons indicted by the Tribunal and provision of information to assist in Tribunal investigations;

4. *Emphasizes* its full support for the continued role of the High Representative in monitoring the implementation of the Peace Agreement and giving guidance to and coordinating the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved in assisting the parties to implement the Peace Agreement, and *reaffirms* that the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding the interpretation of Annex 10 on civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement and that in case of dispute he may give his interpretation and make recommendations, and make binding decisions as he judges necessary on issues as elaborated by the Peace Implementation Council in Bonn on 9 and 10 December 1997;

5. *Expresses* its support for the declarations of the Ministerial meetings of the Peace Implementation Conference;

6. *Recognizes* that the parties have authorized the multinational force referred to in paragraph 10 below to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;

7. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina under close review, taking into account the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 25 below, and any recommendations those reports might include, and its readiness to consider the imposition of measures if any party fails significantly to meet its obligations under the Peace Agreement;

II

8. *Pays tribute* to those Member States which participated in the multinational stabilization force established in accordance with its resolution 1088 (1996), and *welcomes* their willingness to assist the parties to the Peace Agreement by continuing to deploy a multinational stabilization force;

9. *Notes* the support of the parties to the Peace Agreement for the continuation of the multinational stabilization force, set out in the declaration of the Ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Conference in Madrid on 16 December 1998 (S/1999/139, annex);

10. *Authorizes* the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to continue for a further planned period of 12 months the multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as established in accordance with its resolution 1088 (1996) under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement, and *expresses* its intention to review the situation with a view to

extending this authorization further as necessary in the light of developments in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

11. *Authorizes* the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, *stresses* that the parties shall continue to be held equally responsible for compliance with that Annex and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by SFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that Annex and the protection of SFOR, and *takes note* that the parties have consented to SFOR's taking such measures;

12. *Authorizes* Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of SFOR, either in defence of SFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and *recognizes* the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack;

13. *Authorizes* the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above, in accordance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules and procedures established by the Commander of SFOR, governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic;

14. *Requests* the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate with the Commander of SFOR to ensure the effective management of the airports of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the responsibilities conferred on SFOR by Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement with regard to the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

15. *Demands* that the parties respect the security and freedom of movement of SFOR and other international personnel;

16. *Invites* all States, in particular those in the region, to continue to provide appropriate support and facilities, including transit facilities, for the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above;

17. *Recalls* all the agreements concerning the status of forces as referred to in Appendix B to Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, and *reminds* the parties of their obligation to continue to comply therewith;

18. *Requests* the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to continue to report to the Council, through the appropriate channels and at least at monthly intervals;

* * *

Reaffirming the legal basis in the Charter of the United Nations on which the IPTF was given its mandate in resolution 1035 (1995),

III

19. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNMIBH, which includes the IPTF, for an additional period terminating on 31 December 2002, and *also decides* that, during that period, the IPTF shall continue to be entrusted with the tasks set out in Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement, including the tasks referred to in the Conclusions of the London, Bonn, Luxembourg, Madrid and Brussels Conferences and agreed by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

20. *Welcomes* the decision of the European Union (EU) to send a Police Mission (EUPM) to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1 January 2003 as well as the close coordination between the European Union, UNMIBH and the High Representative to ensure a seamless transition and the invitation of the EU to non-EU member States to participate in the EUPM;

21. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed and to report in six months on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIBH as a whole;

22. *Reiterates* that the successful implementation of the tasks of the IPTF rests on the quality, experience and professional skills of its personnel, and once again *urges* Member States, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure the provision of such qualified personnel;

23. *Reaffirms* the responsibility of the parties to cooperate fully with, and to instruct their respective responsible officials and authorities to provide their full support to, the IPTF on all relevant matters;

24. *Reiterates* its call upon all concerned to ensure the closest possible coordination between the High Representative, SFOR, UNMIBH and the relevant civilian organizations and agencies so as to ensure the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement and of the priority objectives of the civilian consolidation plan, as well as the security of IPTF personnel;

25. *Urges* Member States, in response to demonstrable progress by the parties in restructuring their law enforcement institutions, to intensify their efforts to provide, on a voluntary-funded basis and in coordination with the IPTF, training, equipment and related assistance for local police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

26. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to continue to submit to the Council reports from the High Representative, in accordance with Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement and the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 4 and 5 December 1996 (S/1996/1012), and later Peace Implementation Conferences, on the implementation of the Peace Agreement and in particular on compliance by the parties with their commitments under that Agreement;

27. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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15 July 2002
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Letter dated 15 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

At the time when the Security Council is about to consider the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the Government of Morocco would like to reiterate its commitment in favour of a just and lasting political solution to the regional dispute that was artificially created to block the legitimate right of the Kingdom of Morocco to its territorial integrity.

Indeed, as soon as the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy introduced the draft Framework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara to the Security Council in June 2001 (S/2001/613, annex I), the Government of Morocco expressed its willingness to negotiate on that basis, with the necessary flexibility, in order to achieve a final solution to the dispute.

The draft Framework Agreement stems from the necessity to reach a political compromise based on a substantial devolution of authority to the population concerned, while respecting the Kingdom of Morocco's prerogatives of sovereignty.

Unfortunately, Algeria and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Ahmra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) decided to ignore resolution 1359 (2001) adopted by the Security Council on 29 June 2001, and refused the negotiations proposed by Mr. James A. Baker III, the Personal Envoy, in the Pinedale meeting (Wyoming, 27-29 August 2001). The situation got even worse when they submitted the idea of partition of the territory, which constitutes a threat to the stability of the whole Maghreb region, in a clear attempt to block the process of a political solution.

It is therefore obvious that the Security Council is called upon to decide whether to grant a clear mandate to Mr. Baker in order to allow him to carry on his task of political mediation initiated by the draft Framework Agreement, or to maintain the status quo, with all its inherent risks.

The Government of Morocco sincerely hopes that the Security Council will encourage the pursuit of the political solution initiated by Mr. Baker in June 2001 to settle the Western Sahara regional dispute, thus paving the way to Maghreb regional development.

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I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **Bennouna**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2002/759

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 15 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The wrap-up session of the Security Council under the presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic was held on 28 June 2002. With reference to my note verbale dated 25 June 2002 (S/2002/701), it was agreed that after the wrap-up session, and if appropriate, the presidency might prepare a summary paper on the main points raised at the wrap-up session.

The summary paper is attached (see annex). The purpose of the paper is to indicate the areas and suggestions for follow-up action. It is not meant to be exhaustive on the issues raised, but for use as a resource to improve the work of the Security Council, both procedural and substantive.

I would be grateful if the contents of the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of members of the Council and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mikhail **Wehbe**
Ambassador

02-48232 (E) 170702 170702

Annex to the letter dated 15 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Wrap-up meeting on the work of the Security Council for the month of June 2002, held on 28 June 2002

Points concerning the wrap-up meeting of the Council

Some members said that the holding of wrap-up meetings to assess the work of the Council was a matter of importance and that it would be useful to continue the practice.

A number of speakers said that they saw no need to hold such wrap-up meetings every month.

Some speakers stressed that it was important to translate delegations' observations on the working methods of the Council into rules for the future work of the Council, because this practice would have no point unless the numerous observations were taken into account.

In general, a number of speakers emphasized the importance of holding an increased number of open meetings of the Council at which Member States could present their views on the issues on the Council's agenda.

The situation in Afghanistan

Speakers expressed their satisfaction at the discussions that had taken place in the Council during the month of June on the situation in Afghanistan. They mentioned, in particular, the Council's sustained monitoring of the meetings of the Loya Jirga, inasmuch as they constituted a fundamental advance towards the achievement of peace and stability in the country. In the context of the security situation in Afghanistan, a number of representatives spoke of how to deal with the security issue outside Kabul. A number of speakers also welcomed the efforts being made by the International Security Assistance Force to enable the Loya Jirga to hold its meetings in a peaceful atmosphere. They also emphasized that the security situation in Afghanistan must remain a priority on the agenda of the Security Council. The speakers stressed that Security Council resolution 1401 (2002) was clear evidence of support for the peace process in Afghanistan and for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement generally.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Many speakers said that the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region had been timely, since it had preceded the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and had enabled members to become acquainted at close hand with the actual situation.

Speakers expressed their concern that the situation remained tense, particularly in Kisangani; the Council must exert every effort to impose respect for its resolutions on the parties concerned.

Speakers agreed that the Council, through its handling of the various developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, had sent a clear message to the parties to the conflict to ensure the holding of a comprehensive dialogue and also to guarantee the safety of the members of MONUC.

Speakers emphasized the need for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Middle East

A number of speakers said that the Council had difficulty in dealing with the topic of the Middle East and that the Council had held many meetings for the purpose of discussing the situation in the region.

A number of speakers welcomed the opportunity afforded by Farouk Al-Shara', Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, presiding over the Council and being able to hear from him directly about the Syrian position on political developments in the region, and they commended the useful and constructive discussion held during the meeting.

A number of Council members spoke of the need to mobilize all efforts to achieve a comprehensive and just peace in the region. Representatives referred to the Arab peace initiative endorsed by the Beirut Summit and the work being done by the quadripartite committee, as well as to the statement by the President of the United States of America, George W. Bush.

Speakers stressed the need for the Security Council to assume its full responsibilities with regard to the Middle East. Some speakers spoke of the urgent need for the convening of meetings at which Council members could exchange views on opportunities and prospects for activating the Middle East peace process on the basis of the resolutions of international legitimacy, particularly Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

Somalia

There was general agreement that it had been a long time since the Council had discussed the situation in Somalia. The suffering of the Somali people was still continuing, because the problem remained unresolved.

The view was generally expressed that the Council must deal with the situation in Somalia more effectively.

A number of Council members spoke of the importance of implementing Security Council resolutions relating to the implementation of the arms embargo imposed on Somalia.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 15 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Economic Community of West African States, I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to General Chekh Omar Diarra, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States, to address the Security Council, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, during its consideration of the Mano River Union on 18 July 2002.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**

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United Nations S/2002/760*

Security Council

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Original: English

Letter dated 15 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to General Chekh Omar Diarra, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States, to address the Security Council, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, during its consideration of the Mano River Union on 18 July 2002.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

02-48069* (E) 180702

United Nations S/2002/761

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 15 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the African Union, I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to Ambassador Amadou Kébé, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, to address the Security Council, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, during its consideration of the Mano River Union on 18 July 2002.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**

02-48080 (E) 160702

United Nations S/2002/761*

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 15 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the African Union, I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to Mr. Sylvian Ngung, Deputy Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, to address the Security Council, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, during its consideration of the Mano River Union on 18 July 2002.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**

* Reissued for technical reasons.

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United Nations S/2002/761**

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 15 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to Mr. Sylvian Ngung, Deputy Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, to address the Security Council, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, during its consideration of the Mano River Union on 18 July 2002.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**

** Second reissue for technical reasons.

02-48080** (E) 180702

United Nations S/2002/762

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 9 July 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the presidential statement of 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The Security Council also requested that the Panel submit an interim report after three months and a final report at the end of the mandate.

The Panel resumed its work in February 2002 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt), and presented its interim report in May 2002. Recently, Ambassador Kassem notified the Secretariat that the Panel would need additional time to complete its work, due to delays in receiving responses to the Panel's questionnaires sent to Member States and organizations concerned, as well as the need to fully corroborate some significant evidence, that the Panel had received lately.

Accordingly, I should like to recommend that the Panel's mandate be extended until 31 October 2002. Such an extension would also enable the Chairman to prepare for the presentation of the Panel's report to the Council and respond to any questions or comments Council Members may have, as well as to finalize the Panel's work shortly thereafter.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

02-48101 (E) 160702

United Nations S/2002/763

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 12 July 2002 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 9 July 2002 (S/2002/762) concerning the extension of the mandate of the Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of your recommendation that the Panel's mandate be extended until 31 October 2002 to enable it to finalize its work before the end of October 2002.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2002/764

Security Council

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16 July 2002

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Note by the President of the Security Council

Following informal consultations on 16 July 2002 concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the members of the Security Council agreed that the attached report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the events that occurred in Kisangani on 14 and 15 May 2002 would be circulated as a document of the Security Council (see annex).

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Annex

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the events that occurred in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on 14 and 15 May 2002

A. Introduction

On 24 May 2002, the Security Council in a Presidential Statement, drew my attention "to the seriousness of the events that took place in Kisangani on 14 May 2002 and immediately thereafter". Following that Statement, as a first step a joint working-level mission from the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC) and my Office went to Kisangani from 14 to 30 May and reported back on 31 May. The preliminary report demonstrated that there was a need for an expert-level inquiry. In view of the unavailability of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I contacted the most relevant thematic mechanism of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, i.e. the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Ms. Asma Jahangir, asking her to visit the area and carry out further investigations on my behalf. She responded positively and carried out a fact-finding mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where she visited Kinshasa, Goma and Kisangani from 16 through 22 June 2002. The present initial report focuses on the most acute findings from the Special Rapporteur's mission as well as further information collected since then. It contains observations and recommendations requiring urgent attention

During the mission the Special Rapporzeur had the opportunity to meet with representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the Minister for Human Rights, the Minister of Justice and the Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs. The visit also included a number of meetings with representatives of United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations. In all locations, the Special Rapporteur also met with a number of representatives of civil society, including religious communities, local human rights non-governmental organizations and individual human rights activists. She was also able to talk to witnesses and families of victims. In Goma and Kisangani, the Special Rapporteur met with representatives of the leadership of Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma (RCD-G). The authorities of the RCD-G presented her with the report on

the findings of the RCD-appointed Commission of Inquiry on the May events in Kisangani.[1]

The situation in Kisangani after 14 May is still volatile and there is an immediate need to take preventive measures so that any further incidents of violence can be curtailed. The excesses committed by the RCD-G authorities are serious and there could be further reprisals, which may erupt in a spiral of violence, and spread to other areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There is hardly any deterrence to such violence, as impunity is virtually guaranteed to those in positions of authority, even when serious human rights violations, such as massacres are committed by them. The Special Rapporteur intends to report in full detail on her visit in a separate mission report to be submitted to the fifty-ninth session of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Special Rapporteur informed me that she carried out her mission in relative freedom. While she was, in theory, free to see all persons and locations she wished, the tense security situation and the pervasive fear of the RCD-G authorities among the population prevented her from meeting with some individuals who had valuable information, but who were unwilling to be seen anywhere near the Special Rapporteur. Despite these limitations there was an overwhelming amount information, and after giving assurances of confidentiality the Special Rapporteur was able to receive sufficient material to draw the firm conclusion that on 14 May 2002 the authorities of the RCD-G carried out summary executions and extrajudicial killings of civilians, soldiers and the police.

This report focuses on the May events in Kisangani and was prepared rapidly, due to the urgency of responding to the Security Council's call on me. In order not to lose sight of the broader context in which the present incident took place, I would like to recall that numerous massacres and extrajudicial killings have occurred in the country in the last several years in the context of the on-going conflict. Impunity continues to be a major cause of human rights violations in the DRC.

B. Findings and observations

While it is clear that investigations must continue in order to establish in detail the facts, as well as profiles of victims and perpetrators of the events on and immediately after 14 May 2002 in Kisangani, I wish to present some initial observations based on the information received by

[1] Annex I to the present report.

the Special Rapporteur and testimonies available to her at this stage. This material indicates that extrajudicial killings and summary executions were committed in at least five main locations as described below.[2] In the description of events an attempt will also be made to draw up a rough time-line in order to illustrate the apparent sequence of the events in Kisangani on 14 May 2002.

At around 05:00 on 14 May 2002, sporadic gunfire was reportedly heard in central Kisangani, as dissidents allegedly also went to the local prison to free prisoners and headed for the RTNC radio station. At 06:00 the mutineers reportedly captured the radio station apparently without any ostensible resistance or shots being fired. In their broadcast, of which the Special Rapporteur has transcripts[3] presented to her by a number of interlocutors, the mutineers called upon the population to rise against the "Rwandan invaders", "to kill the Rwandans" and "to chase them out". The dissidents also called upon the MONUC and its Okapi radio-station to inform the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the situation and to forward their request for reinforcements by air. In addition they called out to named military commanders and civil society organizations to join them. In response to the broadcast, civilians and soldiers began to move towards the city centre from municipalities in the outskirts of Kisangani. Between 07:50 to 08:10, the RCD-G authorities reportedly went on the air announcing that they had recaptured the RTNC radio station, apparently without any resistance. During later broadcasts, the Acting Commander of the Seventh Brigade, Commander Ivon Nguizama, and the Governor addressed the population announcing that the "the trouble-makers and the thieves are now on the run and that the town is back under the full control of the RCD". (Commander Ivon is now under arrest in Goma. The Special Rapporteur met him.) The population was also ordered to stay at home, as RCD troops would "kill those who are in the street". The Governor in his intervention on the radio banned all associations and public meetings. By 12:00 the RCD-G had regained control of the city. At around 11:00 or 12:00 two aircraft carrying some 120 soldiers flew in from Goma to Kisangani. At the same time, a plane with a high-level military delegation arrived from Goma, including the actual Commander of the Seventh Brigade in Kisangani, Commander Laurent Kunda, who had been visiting Goma, his

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[2] a. Mangobo Municipality
b. Bangboka airport
c. Ketele military Camp
d. Tshopo bridge
e. Detention centre at headquarters of Seventh Brigade

[3] A transcript prepared by MONUC is annexed (Annex II) to the present report.

predecessor Commander Gabriel Amisi (also known as "Tangofort") and Commander Bernard Byamungu of the Seventy-second Brigade.

According to the report by the official RCD-G appointed Commission of Inquiry, seven persons were killed by members of the population heeding the call of the mutineers to attack "Rwandans": (1) Mr. Ndayire, a Rwandan businessman, was stoned to death in front of the "Lengema" building; (2) The body-guard of Commander Ivon Nguizama, called "Zaïrois" was taken out of prison and shot dead, whereafter his body was burned in central Kisangani; (3) Commander Saidi was stoned and hacked to death with machetes outside the municipal building in Mangobo; (4) A visitor, Bongungu Fili, was killed as the perpetrators were looking for RCD-G Commander "Franck" in his residence in Avenue Mamayemo; (5) A 3-year-old child was killed in the same incident, apparently by a stray bullet; (6) A police officer named Okito, an ethnic Hema, who was the commander of the Lumbulumbu camp, was killed in Mangobo; (7) A young woman called "Yalanga" was killed with machetes, apparently because of her "Rwandan appearance". Information provided by international and independent local observers identify the same victims of alleged mob-killings committed during the occupation of the RTNC radio station.

In discussions with the Special Rapporteur, the RCD-G authorities emphasized their view that the call to "kill Rwandans" in the mutineer's broadcast referred not only to persons of Rwandan nationality, i.e. foreigners, but also to Congolose Tutsis and Banyamulenge. According to the authorities the local language Lingala does not make a clear distinction between persons of Rwandan nationality and Congolose Tutsis. As a result of this all persons of Rwandan expression were also at risk of being killed, the RCD-G argued. However, other local sources told the Special Rapporteur that Lingala does make a clear distinction between these two categories of people. The argument has little significance as there was a clear incitement to use violence against Rwandan nationals. Given the ethnic complexity of the region, a mob could stretch the message further in attacking all those of Rawandan expression. During a meeting with the authorities in Kisangani, Commander Laurent Kunda, expressed his distress over the ethnically based incitement to kill by the rebels. He explained that his bodyguard, a Tutsi Congolese, was in the detention cell with another non-Tutsi soldier. The crowd singled his bodyguard out and killed him.

In addition to the killings referred to above, the report prepared by the RCD-G Commission of Inquiry identifies a second category of victims

consisting of (a) soldiers and police killed in fighting between mutineers and loyalists; and (b) civilians killed by RCD-G troops during the operation aimed at disarming and "neutralizing" civilians carrying fire arms. In the report, one loyalist policeman and one male civilian are identified under this heading.

According to the report, after realizing that the rebellion was about to fail, a group of mutineers joined the so-called "Bana Etats-Unies" (a militant political group, which had been called upon to join the rebellion over the radio by the mutineers) and had gone to the municipality of Mangobo, which led to continued fire-fights in that municipality. The RCD-G report identifies twenty-one civilians said to have been killed in cross-fire between mutineers and loyalist forces in Mangobo.

Other sources, including several eyewitnesses, indicate that on 14 and 15 May 2002 RCD-G loyalist troops used excessive, indiscriminate and deliberate lethal force against unarmed civilians in the municipality of Mangobo, particularly in the areas of Matete, Walengola, Walendu, Bambole, Baboa, and Babali. Some of the deaths reportedly occurred as a result of indiscriminate and random gunfire aimed at terrorizing the population, while other victims lost their lives in what would appear to be targetted extrajudicial executions. An unconfirmed number of people were reportedly also abducted and disappeared from Mangobo. There are numerous reports of looting, ill-treatment and rape in connection with these operations. While the exact number of people summarily executed and extrajudically killed in Mangobo cannot be determined without more exhaustive investigations, the Special Rapporteur does have information with names of forty-eight civilians extrajudicially killed on 14 May 2002, in that municipality. This version was fully supported by injured eyewitnesses and families of victims. The medical doctors, treating the injured confirmed that many of the injured were fired upon at close range. In one case, a man was shot dead while bathing.

It is reported that in the morning of 14 May at around 09:00, RCD-G loyalist troops began arresting police and military, alleged to have been part of the mutiny, mainly at Makiso and Camp Ketele. Many police officers were reportedly also detained after having been summoned for inspection at the Seventh Brigade Headquarters. RCD-G officers were also reported to have confiscated private vehicles, which were later identified by witnesses as being used to transport detainees to be summarily executed and dead bodies for burial. Eyewitness testimonies and reports indicate that in the night of 14 May trucks were taking an unknown number of soldiers and police officers to Bangoka airport, 15

kilometres east of Kisangani, where they were allegedly executed and buried in an unknown place. In one case, two soldiers had been shot, but one survived as he fell unconscious after the shooting and was left for dead. He subsequently managed to escape from the scene. Eyewitness accounts of soldiers being held in detention at Bangoka before disappearing, were provided to the Special Rapporteur by a number of individuals. The Special Rapporteur also heard testimonies of summary executions carried out at the Ketele military camp in Kisangani.

In the night of 14 May trucks with arrested police and soldiers were also seen arriving at the Tshopo bridge and the UNIBRA beach. All access to the bridge had reportedly been blocked by RCD-G soldiers prior to this operation. Witnesses gave accounts of how a large number of police and military with their hands bound were ordered to lie down on the ground and then shot, hacked to death with machetes or had their throats slit by RCD-G loyalist soldiers on the Tshopo bridge. Many of the perpetrators were reportedly soldiers wearing red berets. It appears that some of the bodies were decapitated, before being thrown in the river. Some of the bodies were reportedly put in plastic bags. One witness the Special Rapporteur spoke to had met and talked to four soldiers who were washing themselves and their clothes from blood after having participated in the disposal of bodies after these summary executions. Later witnesses also observed soldiers trying to wash blood stains and sprinkle sand on the bridge. The Special Rapporteur met a number of witnesses living next to the Tshopo bridge, who had heard gunshots and subsequently seen blood spluttered on the bridge. It appears that the news of "an operation" at the Tshopo bridge had spread quickly and by the next day a number of people were already aware of it.

In the morning of 16 May, the bridge reopened and a few soldiers remained nearby. By the evening, the first bodies were seen floating on the Tshopo river. According to one eyewitness, the first body that surfaced was naked with hands bound in a piece of underwear. The next-day around 7 a.m. more bodies appeared, some decapitated, others bound or in bags. A total of at least 20 bodies were spotted by fishermen and local people on 16 and 17 May near the bridge on the UNIBRA beach and further down-stream at Isangi. MONUC military observers and human rights personnel observed twelve bodies floating in the river in between 07:00 and 08:00 on 17 May. As a result, on 17 May at around 08:30 RCD-G soldiers cordoned off the area around the bridge and the beach. Shots were fired in the air to keep local spectators at bay. MONUC staff trying to gain access to the scene were firmly turned away. Witnesses saw RCD-G soldiers recovering the bodies and loading them

into two trucks, one of which was yellow Leyland truck (licence plate HZ 51 67 B) requisitioned earlier from its private owner by RCD-G officers. The same sources say that the corpses were taken to an unknown location for burial.

It is alleged that the corpses recovered from the river were buried in an unknown location. There were rumours of a mass-grave close to end of the runway at the Bangoko airport. Another report received was of a mass grave dug at the Red Cross cemetery, which was later abandoned. There was indeed a huge pit dug at the Red Cross cemetery which was left open. The RCD-G authorities admit having recovered eleven corpses but were evasive when asked where the bodies found in the river were buried. They replied that some were buried by them and the rest by the local Red Cross, but did not disclose the location of the graves.

In reference to the above incident, the report by the RCD-G Commission of Inquiry states that a group of four mutineers reportedly fled towards the Tshopo river, where they took a Belgian businessman Mr. Troupin hostage, and stole his motorized pirogue. After having abandoned Mr. Troupin, the four mutineers allegedly capsized with the pirogue before reaching the town of Bumba. One of them drowned, while the three other survived. However, the RCD-G report indicates that no less than eleven corpses of mutineers who had drowned while trying to escape had been recovered from the river Tshopo. When asked where the bodies were buried the RCD-G authorities gave no precise locations or grave-sites. Nor was there any specific mention of this in the report of the RCD commission of inquiry. The RCD-G categorically deny that any executions took place at the Tshopo river. There is clearly a gap in the RCD-G report. In one instance the RCD-G Commission claims that one mutineer drowned, while later admitting to having recovered 11 bodies from the river, without giving any details about the origin of these corpses.

In the detention centre at the Headquarters of the Seventh Brigade in Kisangani, 17 deserters (mutineers) were under arrest. The following prisoners were present at the time of the Special Rapporteur's visit at the detention centre: Bembide Gegbele, Kongolo Ekofo,, Jean-Claude Azagu, Roger Besoke, David Bofola, Toso Alomo, Gelongo Bolima, Nyembo Kitenge, and Kasongo Monga. Another prisoner in the same group, Mudaka Akungu, had reportedly been hospitalised, and the remaining seven sent for "re-orientation". One prisoner had been released earlier. The Special Rapporteur met three of these persons, who apprehended danger to their lives. During her visit at the detention centre, and

subsequently the Special Rapporteur learnt of prisoners, who had been taken out of the detention centre and shot dead. The families of these prisoners were given no information about their fate and whereabouts. They had learnt from one escaped soldier that some of the detainees were shot dead while being shifted to another place.

The RCD-G Commission's report identifies a total of forty-one fatalities as resulting from the events on and immediately after 14 May 2002. According to the report, and as noted earlier, only one person, an armed civilian, was directly killed by RCD-G loyalist forces. The remaining forty deaths were described as follows: seven people were killed by unruly mobs, one loyalist police officer was killed in confrontations with the mutineers, eleven mutineers drowned in the river Tshopo while trying to escape, and twenty-one civilians were killed in cross-fire between the two sides in the municipality of Mangobo. In other words, only two armed combatants would have been killed in these clashes, while twenty-one civilians would have lost their lives as so-called "collateral damage". In discussion with the Special Rapporteur, the RCD-G leadership stated that nobody had been executed, summarily or otherwise, by its forces during or after the events of 14 May.

A number of people handed over lists of those allegedly executed by the authorities to the Special Rapporteur. She cross-checked these as cautiously as she could.[4] According to her calculation based on the material given, 103 civilians and 60 police and military persons have been identified as reportedly summarily executed in connection with the events of 14 May. In addition 20 corpses were spotted floating in the Tshopo river. It was pointed out that a number of bodies thrown into the river may never have surfaced or been discovered. These figures are only indicative of the potential scale of summary executions.

There were valid concerns and a need to react on the part of the authorities following the takeover of the RTNC radio station and the mutineers' broadcasts. Firstly, their position was challenged by a mutiny. Secondly, the radio broadcast did incite the population to violence and killings targeting "Rwandans". However, the RCD-G's reprisals and crack-down were brutally calculated to collectively punish a population, including soldiers and police, with the intention of silencing their protests against RCD-G's oppression and its alliance with Rwandan troops present in the area. The May massacre has only sharpened tensions and opposition to the authorities and their Rwandan allies.

[4] Similar names were counted only once. At the same time it should be noted, that the same person may appear under different names.

The RCD-G authorities are exploiting the situation by emphasizing and publicising that the mutineers were pointedly asking the population to kill Congolese Tutsis and Banyamulenge. They also justify the authorities' use of force post-rebellion on the plea of protecting the Tutsi population. In this way they have isolated the Tutsi community from the rest of the population, made them vulnerable and polarized society. A number of interlocutors warned of ethnic violence, which could be initiated by the authorities themselves, to carry out another "operation" against the people so that all opposition to RCD-G is effectively silenced. Given the history of violence and ethnically based conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I am concerned that the situation may deteriorate rapidly.

Members of civil society expected MONUC to physically intervene to protect the people from the excesses and abuses of the RCD-G after 14 May. A large number of members and leaders of civil society are now on the run. Their lives are at risk and they look toward MONUC to protect them. The pressure on MONUC is high. In the present circumstances their presence is critical. Security Council resolution 1417 of 14 June 2002, provides an important basis under which the MONUC mission could protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

In discussion with the Special Rapporteur, RCD-officials and other observers indicated that they had observed unrest and increased tensions amongst the people, the military and the police, both prior to and after the 14 May incident. On 8 March, a large number of students staged a protest in Kisangani against electricity power failure. The meagre progress made in the Inter-Congolese dialogue in Sun City had further disappointed the people. Soldiers and police were not being regularly paid, which added to their frustration. Thus, the spontaneous turnout of around 4-5 thousand civilian on the call of the mutineers further supports the impression that the people of Kisangani are opposed to the presence of elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and hold the authorities responsible for it.[5] The background to 14 May highlights the fragility of the situation. It should be noted that the tension is not over, and there are predictions that further bloodshed and massacre could occur if notice is not taken of the killings of 14 May and those responsible not brought to justice.

[5] The figure of 4-5 thousand was given by the authorities.

C. Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions

1. The de facto authority of Kisangani the RCD-G, is responsible for the massacres that took place after regaining control over the city's radio station. The Special Rapporteur has information identifying 103 civilians and at least 60 soldiers and police officers have been extrajudicially killed by the RCD-G authorities. Reports indicate that another 20 unidentified bodies were observed in the Tshopo river in the days following the incident. These figures clearly exceed those given by the RCD-G, which further underlines the urgent need to bring the perpetrators to justice. The actual number of victims may be higher than the ones so far detected, as the data presently available has been gathered and complied under immense pressure in a traumatized and terrorized society.

2. The official inquiry conducted by the RCD-G authorities makes a feeble attempt at exonerating the human rights violations carried out by its representatives and soldiers. It further strengthens the argument that the authorities are making all attempts to protect the perpetrators and conceal the true facts.

3. There is a genuine fear amongst the detainees at the detention centre at the Headquarters of the Seventh Brigade in Kisangani, that the authorities would execute them before any reasonable trial can be held.

4. Several members of civil society are on the run, as they genuinely fear use of violence against them. The Special Rapporteur is inclined to conclude that their lives are at risk, and they need immediate protection.

5. The RCD-G authorities have taken no confidence building measures to allay fears of ethnic reprisals or to reach out to the general public to resolve the ethnic tensions that may be building in society. On the contrary there seems to be a tendency amongst some members of the authorities to attribute the whole episode to ethnic incitement and play upon it to further aggravate the situation.

6. In the last several years, numerous massacres have occurred in the DRC by various parties to the conflict. Impunity continues to be a major cause of human rights violations in the country.

Recommendations

1. The Security Council would need to exert pressure on all parties to the conflict in the DRC to respect human rights and humanitarian law, to protect civilians in times of armed conflict, and to end impunity. In particular, the Council would need to reiterate its call on all neighbouring countries, to exert their influence to have the parties meet their human rights and humanitarian law obligations. In this regard, I note that paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 1417 reaffirmed MONUC's mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

2. The path to entrenched impunity for grave human rights violations must be urgently addressed by all parties to the conflict. In the context of the Kisingani massacre, the authorities should take immediate steps to arrest those amongst them who ordered or were involved in the actual massacre of civilians, soldiers and policeman. Members of the public suspected of the killing of individuals on the incitement of the radio-broadcast should also not be extended any form of impunity.

3. In view of all this, the Security Council should give guidance to MONUC and OHCHR to enable us to follow-up with specific recommendations:

- for the de facto authorities in Kisangani to carry out a full and impartial investigation, including the identification of victims and perpetrators, and take specific measures aimed at ending impunity, providing redress to the victims and preventing repetition of such incidents
- for MONUC, and my Office, to assist in carrying out these recommendations
- for the Security Council to identify ways by which effective protection of civilians in the DRC can be provided – this could include strengthening the rule of law and administration of justice, as well as mechanisms by which all those responsible for violations of human rights and war crimes could be held accountable.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 16 July 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached report from the United Republic of Tanzania, submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
Chairman
Counter-Terrorism Committee

02-48781 (E) 260702

Annex

Letter dated 12 June 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

On instruction from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the report of the United Republic of Tanzania pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Daudi N. **Mwakawago**
Ambassador

Enclosure

Report of the United Republic of Tanzania to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) on counter-terrorism measures

Operative paragraph 1
Subparagraph (a)
Question:
What measures, if any, have been taken to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts in addition to those listed in your responses to questions on 1 (b) to (d)?

Response:
Strict application of 'know your customer' rules and procedures by financial intermediaries is an important element in the fight against both money laundering and financing of terrorism. In June 2000, the Bank of Tanzania, which is established by an Act of Parliament as a central bank, issued an 'Administrative Circular' on money laundering. The circular was issued as part of the Government's efforts to enhance regulatory structures for tracking and combating money laundering activities, which were outlawed by the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1991.

The circular is broadly intended to offer a framework of guidance to banks and financial institutions operating in the United Republic of Tanzania with regard to their responsibility in implementing the spirit of the Proceeds of Crime Act. The effect of the circular is that: banks and financial institutions should not maintain anonymous bank accounts for their customers, and they should instead verify their identities as a matter of priority. The scope of responsibility of commercial banks under the circular entails the following:

i. Developing anti-money laundering policies and procedures.

ii. Developing procedures with regard to retention of records of transactions conducted by banks and financial institutions.

iii. Establishing procedures to verify the identity of customers before establishing banking relationship with them.

iv. Providing training and guidance to staff in procedures and controls against money laundering.

v. Developing reporting mechanism of suspicious transactions to law enforcement agency.

The circular provides for administrative fines that may be imposed against any bank or financial institution in case of violation of any obligation under the circular. These include a monetary fine of not less than Tanzania shillings one million per day, against the institution or defaulting officers of the institution. Persistent violations of the circular may attract other sanctions including suspension from participating on the inter bank foreign exchange market, suspension or removal of officer or permanent disqualification from holding office in any bank or financial Institution and revocation of banking License, to mention a few.

As a follow up mechanism to the circular, the Bank of Tanzania has included in the onsite examination procedures aspects related to detection of suspicious transactions. Onsite examination of banks and financial institutions is done on a regular basis.

The circular also establishes regular on-site examination of banks and financial institutions aimed at detecting suspicious transactions.

Recently, the Bank of Tanzania also issued a directive to all banks and financial institutions requiring them to block and freeze all accounts and properties belonging to individuals and entities linked to terrorism, and prohibited transactions with those companies and individuals. Under the directive, banks and financial institutions were also required to report to the bank of Tanzania current and future activities of those individuals and companies linked to terrorism as provided by the United States of American government.

Notwithstanding these measures, the existing legal and regulatory structures may require upgrading in the context of the regional efforts on anti-money laundering and international initiatives to suppress and prevent the financing of terrorism. In that connection, a comprehensive review of the circular has already been initiated. The review will take into account the need to incorporate aspects of international standards geared towards combating the financing of terrorism, and thereby extend the scope of transactions subject to reporting obligations. More work will focus on the review of the legal framework with a view to strengthening measures aimed at detecting abuses of the financial system and tracking terrorist funds in the light of the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations to Counter Terrorist Financing.

We also recognize the need for enhanced exchange of information between national authorities in combating money laundering and financing of terrorism. As part of regional efforts under the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, (ESAAMLG) Tanzania has established a Multi-disciplinary Anti-Money Laundering Committee to coordinate and spearhead efforts against money laundering in Tanzania. The Committee submits regular country reports on progress achieved with regard to implementation of approved recommendations of the ESAAMLG Task Force.

It might be desirable to extend the mandate of the Committee to include measures towards combating financing of terrorism. In the same vein, initial consultations among stakeholders are also underway to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit in Tanzania, with a view to strengthening financial and economic intelligence information gathering. This will enable Tanzania to benefit from the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units and thereby enhance her intelligence capacity in tracking sources of financing criminal activities including terrorism.

Subparagraph (b)
Question:
What are the offences and penalties in your country with respect to the activities listed in this subparagraph?

Response:
In terms of the Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act of 1984 in particular the provisions of paragraph 5 of the First Schedule, any person who intentionally or willfully organizes, manages, directs supervises or finances a criminal racket and knowingly furnishes advices, assistance or direction in the conduct, financing execution or management of the business affairs of a criminal racket with intent to reap profit or other benefits from such act or to promote or further the criminal objectives of the criminal racket is guilty of an offence of leading organized crime.

Conviction of any person of any economic or other offences under this Act may lead to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fifteen (15) years in addition to any order with respect to the property involved. Such orders may entail forfeiture of such property, divesting of interest of the convicted

person in any enterprise, dissolution of any enterprise or restriction on future activities or investments of a person convicted.

Subparagraph (c)
Question:
What legislation and procedures exist for freezing accounts and assets at banks and financial institutions? It would be helpful if states supplied examples of any relevant action taken.

Response:
The Proceeds of Crime Act of 1991 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act of 1991 provide legislative framework for freezing accounts at banks and financial institutions in Tanzania. Under Part V of the Proceeds of Crime Act restraining orders in respect of property of a person about to be charged with a serious offence or has been charged or convicted of serious offence may be granted by the High Court.

Subparagraph (d)
Question:
What measures exist to prohibit the activities listed in this subparagraph?

Response:
Legislative provisions mentioned in subparagraph (b) above constitute a key element of the measures taken to prohibit the activities listed in subparagraph (d). Essentially, these criminalize any act related to financing, participation, or facilitating through entities operating in Tanzania of any organized crime.

Operative paragraph 2
Subparagraph (a)
Question:
What legislation or other measures are in place to give effect to this subparagraph? In particular, what offences in your country prohibit recruitment to terrorist groups and the supply of weapons to terrorists? What other measures help prevent such activities?

Response:
All military recruitments are done in accordance with the constitution.

Strict Laws and regulations controlling ownership of firearms by individuals are applicable. These include:

- The National Security Act of 1970, which deals with the security of the nation as a whole.
- Arms and Ammunitions Act of 1992, deals with the possession and use of firearms, for, among others personal protection.
- Explosives Act of 1993, for possessing explosives for the purpose of using them in mining industries, road construction etc.

In addition, the business of importing and selling of guns, ammunition and explosives has been confined to a few companies, which are monitored closely by the government.

Subparagraph (b)
Question:
What other steps are being taken to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, and in particular what early warning mechanisms exist to allow swap over of information with other states?

Response:
The Police Force in collaboration with the Immigration Department does all the investigations including the Interpol and a watch list, which is, used as an information exchange with regard to any illegal movements of immigrants.

Subparagraph (c)
Question:
What legislation or procedures exist for denying safe haven to terrorists such as laws for excluding or expelling the types of individuals referred to in this subparagraph? It would be helpful if states supplied examples of any relevant action taken.

Response:
The Extradition Agreement and other Criminal legislation through bilateral agreements are used for the purpose of identifying and denying safe havens to terrorists.

Subparagraph (d)
Question:
What steps have been taken to establish terrorist acts as serious criminal offences and to ensure that the punishment reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts? Please supply examples of any convictions obtained and the sentence given.

Response:
The Government is in the process of strengthening existing national laws in order to incorporate the aspect of terrorism.

Subparagraph (e)
Question:
What legislation or procedures exist to prevent terrorists acting from your territory against other states or citizens? It would be helpful if states supplied examples of any relevant action taken.

Response:
Information exchanges as well as bilateral Extradition Agreements are among the ways, which have been used to identify terrorists and other criminals. A good example is the 1998 terrorist attacks against the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

Subparagraph (f)
Question:
What procedures and mechanisms are in place to assist other states? Please provide any available details of how these have been used in practice.

Response:
At any given point in time, the government is ready to assist through information exchange, Interpol, bilateral extradition agreement and any other relevant means to make sure that all criminal proceedings related to terrorist acts are carried out smoothly with the intention of obtaining evidence necessary for the proceedings.

Subparagraph (g)
Question:
How do border controls in your country prevent the movement of terrorists? How do your procedures, for instance, of identity papers and travel documents to support these? What measures exist to prevent their forgery etc.?

Response:
The Government authority, with the intention to contain not only illegal immigrants but also criminals, properly controls all the border entries/points. Apart from this, information exchange and a watch list is also used for the same purpose.

Operative paragraph (3)
Subparagraph (a)
Question:
What steps have been taken to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information in the areas indicated in this subparagraph?

Response:
The government uses various ways in accelerating the exchange of operational information with regard to movements of terrorists. Such means include arms control regulations, immigration control, information exchange and others as may be necessary.

Subparagraph (b)
Question:
What steps have been taken to exchange information and cooperate in the areas indicated in this subparagraph?

Response:
All the necessary measures have been taken to exchange information and cooperate on matters related to terrorist activities. The Interpol has been used as the best option for information exchange with other countries. At regional level, the government has been cooperating fully on matters of criminal investigations, specifically on counter-terrorism.

Subparagraph (c)
Question:
What steps have been taken to cooperate in the areas indicated in this subparagraph?

Response:
The Government is cooperating through various regional organizations such as South African Development Community (SADC), East African Community, (EAC) as well as through the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

Subparagraph (d)
Question:
What are your government's intentions regarding signing and/ratifying the conventions, protocols and resolutions referred to in this subparagraph?

Response:
Tanzania has signed and ratified the following Conventions/Protocols related to terrorist activities as follows:

- Convention on Offences and Certain Other Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14th September 1963.

- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16th December 1970.

- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23rd September 1971.

- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving international Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 24th February 1988.

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania is in the process of signing and ratifying other Conventions mentioned in this subparagraph as part of the efforts to counter-terrorism.

Subparagraph (e)
Question:
Provide any relevant information on the implementation of the Conventions, Protocols and Resolutions referred to in this subparagraph.

Response:
Tanzania fully implements the Conventions and Protocols referred to in this subparagraph. In addition the government is trying to align them with existing national laws for their effective implementation.

Subparagraph (f)
Question:
What legislations procedures and mechanisms are in place for ensuring asylum seekers have not been involved in terrorist activity before granting refugee status? Please supply examples of any relevant cases.

Subparagraph (g)
Question:
What procedures are in place to prevent the abuse of refugee status by terrorist? Please provide details of legislations and/or administrative procedures, which prevent claims of political motivation being recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorist. Please supply examples of any relevant case.

Response:
With regard to the questions raised in subparagraphs (f) and (g) on granting refugee status to asylum seekers, the government of Tanzania strictly and fully adheres to the implementation of the provisions of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the OAU Protocol of 1967. The process of requesting for asylum is carefully scrutinized where an applicant is suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.

In addition to that, the Tanzania Refugee Act of 1998 has laid down strict administrative procedures and mechanisms for granting of refugee status to any asylum seeker. The National Eligibility Committee (NEC), established under the Act, is the relevant body for status determination. It investigates and seeks all relevant information from the appropriate sources within and outside the country and has the right to summon an applicant before it, whenever deemed necessary, to clarify

or answer questions pertaining to his/her claim for refugee status or asylum. The Act requires every asylum seeker or refugee to surrender whichever arms or ammunitions to the relevant authority, failure to which he/she shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

Paragraph 4 on Assistance
Suggestion:
Capacity building in the following areas is needed:

- Identification of criminals and forged documents for officials dealing with business licensing and company registration.

- Information Technology for registration and business licensing officials. It will help them communicate with all stakeholders within and outside the country.

- Monitoring of suspected businesses for terrorists activities.

United Nations S/2002/766

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 10 July 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to inform you that the tour of duty of the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Brigadier-General Claude Buze (Belgium), will come to an end on 10 August 2002. Following the usual consultations, it is my intention to appoint Major-General Gyorgy Szaraz (Hungary) to the post of Force Commander of MINURSO, effective 11 August 2002, subject to the Security Council's decision on the extension of the mandate of MINURSO after 31 July 2002.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

02-48239 (E) 180702

United Nations S/2002/767

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 16 July 2002 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 10 July 2002 (S/2002/766) concerning your intention to appoint Major-General Gyorgy Szaraz (Hungary) to the post of Force Commander of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
President of the Security Council

02-48275 (E) 180702

United Nations S/2002/768

Security Council

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16 July 2002

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Letter dated 11 July 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 11 April (S/2002/411) and the letter of the President of the Security Council dated 12 April (S/2002/412) as a result of which the mandate of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) was extended until 15 July 2002.

As you know, I had asked my Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa, Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim A. Gambari, to lead an integrated assessment mission to Angola in order to prepare recommendations on the tasks to be performed by the United Nations in support of the implementation of the "Memorandum of Understanding for the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of the outstanding issues under the Lusaka Protocol". The team has completed its assessment and its findings will form the basis of my next report to the Council. The Secretariat is in the final stages of planning the future structure and the coordination mechanism of the United Nations presence in Angola, as well as at Headquarters.

In the meantime, I should like to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of UNOA at the current strength for a period of one month, until 15 August 2002. My report to the Council will be presented well in time before the expiry of the extension.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

02-48225 (E) 170702

United Nations S/2002/769

Security Council

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Letter dated 16 July 2002 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, as requested, your recommendation in your letter dated 11 July 2002 (S/2002/768) to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) for a period of one month, until 15 August 2002, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They concurred with this recommendation.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
President of the Security Council

02-48219 (E) 170702

United Nations S/2002/770

Security Council

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Letter dated 11 July 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

As you may be aware, there has been a change in plans since my letter of 14 March (S/2002/294) as regards the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa. I have the honour to inform you that it is my intention to appoint Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah to that position.

Mr. Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania), a seasoned diplomat and a former high-level official of the United Nations, is currently the Executive Director of Global Coalition for Africa, a Washington-based intergovernmental forum.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

02-48213 (E) 170702

United Nations S/2002/771

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

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Letter dated 15 July 2002 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 11 July 2002 (S/2002/770) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah as your Special Representative for West Africa has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
President of the Security Council

02-48207 (E) 170702

United Nations S/2002/772

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 11 July 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my letter to you dated 16 November 2001 (S/2001/1095) and the reply of the President of the Security Council (S/2001/1096) of 21 November 2001 concerning the mandate of my Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, as well as my letter to you dated 27 June 2002 (S/2002/719) and your reply of 2 July 2002 (S/2002/720) on the reassignment of my then Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Mr. Berhanu Dinka, as my Special Representative for Burundi.

It is my honour to inform you that it is my intention to appoint Mr. Ibrahima Fall, former Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, as my Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region. He will take up his new responsibilities in mid-July 2002.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

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United Nations S/2002/773

Security Council

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Letter dated 16 July 2002 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 11 July 2002 (S/2002/772) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Ibrahima Fall as your Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2002/774

Security Council

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17 July 2002

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Letter dated 17 July 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1408 (2002) of 6 May 2002 concerning Liberia. In paragraph 16 of the resolution, the Council requested me to establish, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001), a panel of experts consisting of no more than five members, for a period of three months, to conduct a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States, in order to investigate and compile a report on the Government of Liberia's compliance with the demands contained in subparagraphs 2 (a) to (d) of resolution 1343 (2001); on the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact on the Liberian population of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 to 7 of resolution 1343 (2001); and on any violations of those measures, including any involving rebel movements.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, taking into account the requirements set out in resolution 1408 (2002), including that I draw, as much as possible and as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the panel of experts established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001), I have appointed the following four experts:

1. Mr. Atabou Bodian (Senegal, expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization)
2. Mr. Johan Peleman (Belgium, expert on arms and transportation)
3. Mr. Harjit Singh Sandhu (India, expert with INTERPOL investigative experience)
4. Mr. Alex Vines (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, expert on diamonds)

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

02-48353 (E) 180702

United Nations A/56/1006–S/2002/775

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 17 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest incident in the ongoing Palestinian campaign of terrorism directed against the citizens of Israel.

Shortly after 3 p.m. (local time) today, Palestinian terrorists detonated a roadside bomb as an Israeli passenger bus was passing by on its way to the community of Emanuel. After immobilizing the bus, the terrorists, who had been hiding by the side of the road and were wearing Israeli army uniforms, sprayed the bus with gunfire and hurled anti-tank grenades through its windows as passengers trapped inside scrambled for cover. Eight Israelis were killed in the attack and 16 were wounded, half of them seriously. Among the dead was Tiferet Sarah Shilon, a 9-month-old baby girl, killed along with her 67-year-old grandmother, and her 35-year-old father. Also killed was a baby who had been delivered by emergency Caesarean section after her mother, in the late stages of pregnancy, was injured in the attack.

At least four Palestinian terrorist organizations claimed responsibility for the attack: Hamas; the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Islamic Jihad; and the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, the terrorist wing of Chairman Arafat's own Fatah faction. It is believed that the attack was carried out by the same Hamas cell that carried out a similar attack in the same spot on 12 December 2001, an attack that was referred to in a letter dated 13 December 2001 (A/56/706-S/2001/1198).

Israel holds the Palestinian Authority and its Chairman, Yasser Arafat, responsible for this latest act of terrorism. Such attacks are the inevitable result of the constant incitement to violence in the official Palestinian media, the demonization of Jews and Israelis in Palestinian schools and the financial and logistical support provided to known terrorists by Palestinian Authority officials.

Yesterday's attack confirms the continuing need for Israeli defensive measures in the face of unrelenting threats of Palestinian terrorism. Although it is impossible to thwart every attempted action, countless terror attacks have been prevented in recent weeks by the ongoing efforts of Israeli forces. So long as the Palestinian Authority refuses to fulfil its responsibility to fight terrorism, in accordance with its

02-48396 (E) 170702

signed obligations and the resolutions of the Security Council, Israel will be left with no choice but to take the actions it deems necessary in exercise of its right to self-defense.

I submit this letter in follow-up to my numerous letters detailing the campaign of Palestinian terrorism that began in September 2000.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative